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Abstract 
 
It is known that content has an effect on reasoning. In this paper the influence of the 
content on the structure of reasoning, the access to it, and the ability to handle uncertainty was 
studied. The participants were presented with reasoning tasks about the weather and about the 
oscilloscope in which uncertain premises were introduced. Correct reasoning procedures were 
identified including correct reasoning with wrong answers. In correct reasoning procedures 
about the weather, three different structures of reasoning were identified. The participants 
were mostly able to reason with uncertain components. In reasoning about the oscilloscope, 
less correct reasoning procedures were found. No empirical and theoretical structures were 
used. The hidden structure differed here from the one in the weather case because the 
participants were not able to handle all uncertain components in otherwise correct reasoning. 
The implications of this unique finding for the acquisition of reasoning skills are discussed. 
 
 
 
It is well-known that content has an effect on reasoning (e.g. Wason 1977, 1983). Less is 
known about the content’s influence on the structure of reasoning, the access to such a 
structure and the ability to handle uncertainty in reasoning.  
The type of reasoning studied was related to the following sentence: The sun is shining 
(conclusion) because/ when there isn't a cloud in front of the sun (first premise) and it is 
daytime (second premise). What if it is twelve o'clock and the sky is covered? In this case it is 
daytime (the second premise is true), but it is not true that there isn't a cloud in front of the 
sun (the first premise is false), so the sun is not shining (the conclusion is false). What if it is 
night? It is not daytime, so the sun is not shining, but one cannot tell whether there is a cloud 
in front of the sun or not. In this case the first premise is uncertain. And what if it is a 
cloudless day in July? 
 This reasoning was studied. It would be interesting to know whether this reasoning follows 
processes suggested by (theoretical) logic (e.g. Lemmon, 1965; Schoenfeld, 1967), by 
classical rhetoric (Voss and Means, 1991), or otherwise. The study is empirical. 
The problems were how access to reasoning could be separated from the structure of 
reasoning; how to include uncertainty in reasoning; and how to identify correct reasoning 
procedures including those with a wrong answer. For this it was necessary to define the 
structure in reasoning, to find a type of reasoning in which uncertainty plays a major role, and 
to make a model of the access to the structure. The research questions were: What is the 
structure of reasoning in a well-known domain as compared to a new domain? How does the 
access to reasoning change in these two cases? How does the handling of uncertainty change?  
 
 
THE MODEL OF REASONING  
 
In this case the type of reasoning was: C because A and B in which A, B and C are 
premises and conclusions respectively as in classical rhetoric (Aristotle, 1960; Voss and 
Means, 1991). Both the premises and the conclusion might be true or false or uncertain. In 
fact A, B and C can be viewed as variables that represent the truth values of the premises and 
conclusions. Thus they become the logic variables of theoretical logic (e.g. Schoenfeld, 
1967). 
The set of related reasoning procedures as in the examples above form a structure of 
reasoning. This structure can be represented in a truth table. Usually such a truth table 
contains the elements 1 (‘true’) and 0 (‘false’) as in Table 1.  
 
 
Table 1  
The theoretical reasoning procedures of conjunctive reasoning in two-value logic with two 
logical variables A and B (truth table for a conjunction) 
A B Conjunction 
(C=A^B) 
1 
0 
1 
0 
1 
1 
0 
0 
1 
0 
0 
0 
Note. Each row represents a valid theoretical reasoning procedure. 1 means: true. 0 means: 
false. 
 
The structure in reasoning is represented by the truth table. Uncertainty can be included by 
introducing a third truth value: “one cannot tell”. This adds a third element ? (‘uncertain’) in 
the truth table as in Table 2 (three-value logic). 
 
 
Table 2 
The theoretical reasoning procedures in three-value logic  
A B Conclusion (A^B) 
1 
1 
0 
0 
0 
? 
1 
? 
? 
1 
0 
1 
0 
? 
0 
? 
1 
? 
1 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
? 
? 
? 
Note. Each row represents a theoretical reasoning procedure. 1 means: true. 0 means: false. 
? means: uncertain, one cannot tell. BOLD: reasoning procedures that were investigated. 
 
 
Now that uncertainty is included as a third truth value (Rescher, 1969), access to the 
structure can be modelled by the formation of truth values (see Table 3). 
 
 
Table 3.  
The access to a reasoning procedure 
Logic Premise 1 Premise 2 Conclusion 
Problem: It rains a bit 
↓ 
 It is July  
↓ 
What about the 
sun? 
Assertion: No cloud in front 
of sun  
Daytime The sun is shining 
Variables: 
Structure:  
Values: 
Procedure: 
A 
 
? 
 
B 
 
? 
 
 
A  ^ B 
Access 
?  ^  ?  =  ?  
Answer:   It is uncertain 
whether the sun is 
shining or not 
 
 
METHOD 
 
In reasoning, the content, the number of premises, and/or the truth values of the premises 
can be varied in each reasoning procedure. The participants were forty first-year electrical 
engineering students who were presented with reasoning tasks about the weather and about 
the oscilloscope.  
These reasoning tasks were as follows. An assertion was given: The sun is shining when 
there isn't a cloud in front of the sun and it is daytime. It was explicitly mentioned that this 
was to be taken for sure and correct. 
Then it was asked whether the following statement was true: The sun is shining because it 
is raining a little and it is in the month of July. Five such statements about the weather, a well-
known domain, (see Table 4) and seven statements about the oscilloscope, a new and rather  
unknown domain, were presented to the participants. In these statements the truth values of 
the premises and the conclusion were varied. The number of premises were kept fixed on two.  
 
The problem formulation was: 1. Is the statement true? (with possible answers: Yes, no, 
one cannot tell); 2. Why? Give the reasons for your answer. The number of reasons to be 
given was not specified. The answers and the reasons were collected and analyzed. 
First correct reasoning procedures were identified, that is correct conclusions based either 
on correct arguments (giving a correct answer) or on wrong arguments (giving a wrong 
answer). The main structure of reasoning of the sample was derived from the pattern in the 
correct reasoning procedures (empirical structure), separately for the weather and oscilloscope 
cases. Then the patterns of reasoning of the individual students were identified by comparing 
them with the empirical and the theoretical structure of reasoning. Next the results of the 
weather case and the oscilloscope case were compared. Finally, the access to the structure of 
reasoning was estimated from the relative frequency of correct reasons (in either correct or 
incorrect reasoning procedures). 
 
Table 4 
Statements and corresponding theoretical reasoning procedures as related to the assertion 
The weather case  
 Statements  
 
Procedure 
1. The sun is shining because there is one cloud in the sky and it 
is a quarter of an hour before sunrise. 
? 0→0 
2. The sun is shining because the weather is clear and it is six 
o’clock in the evening. 
1 ?→? 
3. The sun is shining because it is eight o’clock and the weather 
forecast says it is cloudy. 
rev? ?→? 
4. The sun is shining because there are no clouds and the sun has 
just set. 
10→0 
 
 
RESULTS 
 
In Table 5 a summary is presented of the reasoning procedures that were investigated. 
 
Table 5.  
The theoretical reasoning procedures that were investigated (theoretical structure) 
A B Conclusion (A^B) 
1 
? 
1 
? 
0 
0 
? 
? 
0 
0 
? 
? 
 
In Table 6 the empirical reasoning structure found in the weather case is presented. This 
structure was used by 25 % of the participants. Some reasons that should be given from a 
theoretical viewpoint, were consistently left out by these participants. 
 
Table 6.  
The reasoning procedures found in the weather case (empirical structure) 
A B Conclusion  
( 1 ) 
( ? ) 
( 1 ) 
? 
0 
0 
? 
? 
0 
0 
? 
? 
Note. Each row represents a theoretical reasoning procedure. 1: true. 0: false. ?: uncertain. 
( ): not mentioned as a reason 
A theoretical structure in agreement with the theoretical truth table was used by 1 of the 40 
participants. This participant mentioned two reasons in all cases. The other 75 % of the 
participants used mostly the empirical structure but not consistently: in at least one of the five 
reasoning tasks they gave a non consistent reason. The structure of this reasoning was called 
‘hidden’. All participants were mostly able to handle uncertain conclusions and to give both 
uncertain reasons if that was the case in a reasoning task. 
In reasoning about the oscilloscope, less correct reasoning procedures were found. A 
hidden structure could be distinguished only, that differed from the one found in the weather 
case because the participants did not give both uncertain reasons in the reasoning tasks were 
this was the case.  
In Table 7  the incomplete empirical structure found in the oscilloscope case is presented. 
 
Table 7.  
The reasoning procedures found in the oscilloscope case (incomplete empirical structure) 
A B Conclusion  
( 1 ) 
( ? ) 
( 1 ) 
( ? ) 
0 
0 
? 
? 
0 
0 
? 
? 
Note. Each row represents a theoretical reasoning procedure. 1: true. 0: false. ?: uncertain. 
( ): not mentioned as a reason 
 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
Summarized, the consistent reasoning structures found in the Weather case were: 1. a 
theoretical structure with complete access in 1 of 40 participants; 2. an empirical structure 
with complete access in 25 % of the participants. The other 75 % of the participants showed 
inconsistent reasoning with a hidden structure, that could be a part of the empirical structure 
and/or incomplete access.  
In the Oscilloscope case a significant different incomplete empirical structure and/or 
incomplete access was found in all participants. Thus, in a new, complex domain the structure 
of and access to this structure are less organized. Only isolated reasoning procedures are 
available. Not more than one uncertain element is correctly handled in these reasoning 
procedures, in contrast to the weather case. 
From the findings it is concluded that the structure of reasoning becomes more diffuse and 
access to reasoning diminishes in a new domain, and that also the ability to handle uncertain 
components in reasoning diminishes. 
 
 
DISCUSSION 
 
Handling of uncertainty is of particular interest in instruction. Chi et al. (1989) found that 
good students in physics concluded more often than beginners that they did not understand 
some point in the problem-solving process and therefore generated self-explanations and self-
monitoring statements more frequently than poor students did. This was interpreted as a better 
metacognitive awareness of uncertainty of conditions, actions, or goals that required 
elaboration and justification. 
The implications of this unique finding for education are that the students in a new domain 
not only have to learn the subject matter but also reasoning. Some guidelines for this can be 
derived from the findings: 1. Let the students reason and discuss about the content in order to 
make their reasonings more consistent. 2. Be aware of students who reason seemingly over-
precise: a theoretical approach might be at the basis.  
It seems useful to list the assumptions about reasoning used: It is a metacognitive 
skill; it has content (cognitive); it has a structure (several related reasoning procedures); 
consistent and correct reasoning implies that one has acquired a structure and gotten access to 
this structure; unsure or uncertain elements are part of reasoning. These points require careful 
consideration. 
To investigate the metacognitive aspects of reasoning (structure, access, uncertainty) one 
has to eliminate the influence of knowledge of the cognitive content. Therefore in the 
reasoning tasks, an assertion about the content was given as a starting point in order to 
equalize prior knowledge. A statement was then presented, the correctness of which had to be 
determined on the basis of the assertion. Still cognitive knowledge might have some influence 
on the results. 
The research forms part of a study on metacognition in higher education (Vos, 2001, Chap. 
3). Reasoning is considered as a metacognitive skill, that has been developed in most people 
as an implicit, tacit process. Such processes produce tacit knowledge ( Reber, 1989; Hartman, 
Knopman, & Nisson, 1989), in the domain of reasoning. Such knowledge can be 
nonconsciously used (Gleitman, Fridlund, & Resiberg, 1999). The study adds some 
knowledge to the way implicit knowledge becomes structured and accessable knowledge.  
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